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Abstract The aim of this paper is to study the mechanisms behind poverty persis-
tence in Spain. We examine the importance of past poverty experiences for explaining
current poverty as opposed to observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our
results are based on the model proposed by Cappellari and Jenkins (J Appl Eco-
nometr 19:593–610, 2004a) that estimates poverty transitions while simultaneously
controlling for attrition and initial conditions. We find that about 50 % of aggregate
state dependence is genuine: poverty in a given year increases in itself the chances
of experiencing poverty again in the future. The remainder is explained, among other
characteristics, by living with a head of household who has no educational quali-
fications, being an immigrant or cohabiting with teenagers. Our findings call for a
comprehensive and coordinated strategy against poverty that should focus equally
on income-support policies and on enhancing those characteristics that best protect
against economic hardship. From a methodological point of view, we learn that unob-
servables affecting initial conditions and sample retention are exogenous to those
related to poverty transience. However, results prove to be sensitive to the choice of
poverty line.
Keywords Poverty persistence · State dependence · Attrition · Initial conditions
JEL Classification I32 · D31 · C33
1 Introduction
For several reasons, it is crucial to take a longitudinal perspective in the analysis of
poverty in any given context. First, the study of the dynamic aspects of poverty leads to
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a better understanding of the nature of poverty and the type of individuals that suffer it.
A more precise description of poverty is enhanced by learning from the determinants
of poverty entries and exits. Second, dynamic analyses distinguish between chronic
and transient poverty. In this regard, it is commonly agreed that experiencing poverty
for a long period of time is worse than being temporarily below the poverty line. Third,
poverty dynamics enable the study not only of the symptoms but also the processes that
lead to economic deprivation (Jenkins 2011). And, fourth, results on poverty dynamics
are informative for policy design. If poverty is transitory, emphasis should be given to
short-term income-support policies that help to cope with temporary earnings shocks.
However, if poverty is suffered chronically, poor individuals could be better helped
by policies that enhance those characteristics that protect them from adversity—for
example, employability through education or training.
This paper studies poverty dynamics in Spain by focusing on transitions into pov-
erty and, especially, persistence.1 Compared to other European countries, poverty in
Spain is characterised by high levels of incidence and major recurrence (OECD 2008;
Cantó et al. 2012). This means that the poverty line is crossed more often than in
countries with similar poverty rates. At the same time, a sizeable percentage of the
population is persistently below the poverty line. Recent estimates by Jenkins and Van
Kerm (2011) find that 11.0 % of Spaniards are at-risk-of persistent poverty (at least
3 years out of a 4-year window)—only below Estonia, Portugal, Latvia, Ireland and
Italy out of 21 European countries analysed. In this paper, we are concerned with the
mechanisms behind poverty chronicity. On the one hand, persistent poverty could be
due to genuine state dependence: experiencing poverty in a given period increases in
itself the chances of suffering poverty again in the future. On the other hand, certain
observed and unobserved characteristics that persist over time could make someone
more likely to be successively poor. Learning to distinguish between the two also has
important policy implications. If poverty persistence is mostly due to past poverty
experiences, policy design should focus on income transfers. Helping individuals to
move above the poverty line will break the poverty spiral in the future. However, if
poverty persistence is explained by heterogeneity, policies should centre on enhanc-
ing the individual and household characteristics that prevent poverty. Therefore, the
main contribution of our paper is to examine the importance of the two sources of
poverty persistence by measuring, for the first time, the degree of poverty genuine
state dependence in Spain and derive policy recommendations.
With this objective in mind, we apply to Spanish data a model proposed in the liter-
ature by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) that estimates poverty entries and persistence
and deals with the initial conditions problem and the possibility of non-random attri-
tion of the sample. It is important to account for initial conditions because the initially
poor may be a non-random sample of the population and ignoring this may bias our
poverty inflow and outflow estimates. Furthermore, estimates of poverty dynamics
should control for the fact that transitions are only observed for those individuals in
the survey at t − 1 and at t and again these may be a selected group of the original
sample. We assess the endogeneity of both processes to poverty transitions by freely
estimating the correlations between unobservables affecting each outcome. As far as
1 In this study, we use the terms poverty chronicity and persistence interchangeably.
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we know, a similar application to the Spanish case does not exist in the literature and
we will therefore be able to assess whether the determinants of poverty dynamics are
robust to the methodology used.
Our main findings show that about 50 % of the probability of being poor in a given
period is due to past poverty experiences in Spain: there is a sizeable scarring effect
by which poor individuals enter a vicious circle from which it is difficult to escape.
The remaining state dependence is positively associated with a head of household hav-
ing low educational qualifications, being of immigrant origin and teenagers being in
the household, and is negatively associated with the number of workers or cohabiting
with young people. This means that anti-poverty policies in Spain should equally focus
on income-support policies—breaking the poverty spiral—and on social policies that
enhance protective factors—education, training, housing, etc.
From a methodological point of view, we show that unobserved heterogeneity
affecting poverty status in the base year and/or sample retention are exogenous to
unobservables related with poverty transitions when using the standard poverty line.
These results support previous estimates for poverty in Spain based on the European
Community Household Panel that did not account for possibly correlated unobserv-
ables between transience, attrition and initial conditions. However, when the poverty
line is set at 40 or 50 % of the median of equivalent household income we find that
individuals that are more likely to be initially poor are less likely to remain poor
compared to the non-poor—an example of Galtonian regression towards the mean.
Similarly, retained individuals are less likely to remain poor or fall into poverty. Fail-
ure to account for both endogeneities would underestimate our poverty persistence
and entry estimates when poverty is more extremely defined.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2, after this introduction, briefly revises
the existing literature on poverty dynamics devoted to the Spanish case. Section 3
presents the data and some methodological choices, while Sect. 4 shows poverty tran-
sitions on a descriptive level. Section 5 explains the model by Cappellari and Jenkins
(2004a) used in this work and Sect. 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Review
Part of the literature on poverty transience in the Spanish case focuses on the descrip-
tion of trends. Cantó et al. (2003) using the Encuesta Contínua de Presupuestos Fa-
miliares (ECPF) for the 1985–1995 period find that the decline in poverty of the late
1980s may be associated with high exit rates rather than a major improvement in the
situation of those at risk of falling into it. However, the increase in poverty risk expe-
rienced by Spaniards in the early 1990s was due both to the increase in poverty entries
and, especially, to the reduction in poverty exits. Bárcena et al. (2006) update these
results by running a similar descriptive analysis for the 1993–2000 period with data
from the ECHP.2
2 The first estimates of poverty entries and exits in Spain using data from the ECHP are given in García
Mainar and Toharia (1998).
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As for the characterization of poverty dynamics, Cantó (2003) assesses the impor-
tance of demographic and socio-economic characteristics for the probability of poverty
exit. She finds that less than 10 % of the transitions out of poverty are linked to demo-
graphic events while the remainder are related to changes in the labour market or the
receipt of social assistance benefits.
In relation to methodological questions, Cantó et al. (2006) show that the choice
of quarterly or annual income has important consequences for poverty estimates. The
exit rate is fairly similar for both income definitions but the entry rate is higher for
quarterly income. Furthermore, they show that only half of those classified as leavers
by one income definition are equally classified by the other, and the misclassification
is even stronger when considering poverty entries.
Moreover, Cantó et al. (2012) study the profiles of poor individuals according to the
length of their poverty experiences. They distinguish between the chronic and transi-
tory poor and among the latter, those that are recurrent (more than one spell in poverty)
or not. They argue that Spain has relatively low levels of chronicity but a high per-
centage of recurrent poor—especially among households with a head below 65 years
of age, with low educational qualifications, and that is self-employed or cohabits with
young children. However, note that they also find that 15.5 % of Spaniards lived below
the poverty line at least 4 out of 7 years during the same period than the one analysed in
this paper—the highest percentage of all the countries they study except for Portugal.
Researchers have also studied duration dependence in the poverty status. Cantó
(2002) assesses the importance of time in poverty on the measurement of entries and
exits. She proposes a discrete time duration-dependent n-order Markov process with
heterogeneity jointly estimating exits and (re)entries. Results show that one third of
households that escape poverty soon return to it while if they manage to be out of
poverty for 1 year, the chances of falling back into it strongly decrease. Similarly,
Bárcena et al. (2004) argue for the need to consider not only poverty status at t condi-
tional on poverty status at t − 1, but also the time spent in the same poverty status as
t − 1. The probability of poverty transition prove to be smaller when accounting for
time inertia. More recently, Arranz and Cantó (2011) proposed a multi-state multiple
transition discrete hazard regression model that controls not only for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity but also for the length of the current poverty spell, the time
between spells, the occurrence of multiple spells and the accumulation of poverty
spells. They find evidence of negative duration dependence—longer poverty spells
reduce the probability of exit and increase the rixk of (re)entry. Among other results,
second and third poverty spells are found to be shorter than the first, and non-poverty
spells are of longer duration than poverty spells.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2010), on the other hand, are concerned
with feedback effects and examine the poverty implications for past and current tem-
porary employment in Spain. They find that having a temporary contract not only
increases the probability of current poverty but also of future poverty via an indirect
effect that increases the chances of having a type of contract in the future with a higher
poverty risk (while no direct effect of a past temporary contract on poverty is found).
However, in most studies referred to Spain, initial conditions are not explicitly
modelled together with poverty transitions with the exception of Gradín and Cantó
(2011). In this case, the authors study the difference in the probability of being poor
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depending on the presence of children in the household by means of a Heckman model
and a random effects dynamic probit that allows the authors to control for unobserved
heterogeneity and initial conditions. However, the paper does not offer a measure of
genuine state dependence or an explicit control for attrition. Moreover, in Arranz and
Cantó (2011), initial conditions are taken into account by merely adding three variables
to their estimation related to the health of the members of the household, the presence
of working-age females and the head’s unemployment spells in the last 5 years. We
believe the methodology used in this paper offers a more precise control.
As for attrition, Cantó et al. (2003) and Cantó (2003) do take into account potential
non-randomness of sample reduction through the construction of their own sample
weights (also see, for a similar strategy, Ayala et al. 2006). The inconvenience of this
strategy is that the control is over observed heterogeneity only. Finally, Cantó et al.
(2007) estimate poverty exits using a Heckman selection model that controls for reten-
tion. With data from the ECPF for the 1985–1995 period, they find that retention and
poverty exit equations are independent in most of their model specifications. Never-
theless, we are still left with the question as to whether there is a correlation between
unobservables affecting attrition that also influence poverty transience for the later
period between 1994 and 2000.
Finally, and regarding the application of the same econometric strategy, apart from
the original article by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) that studies the British case, Bud-
delmeyer and Verick (2008) have also used it for Australia, Fusco and Islam (2011)
for Luxembourg and Faye et al. (2011) in the case of Nairobi’s slums. Their results are
commented throughout the paper. Variations in the model for the analysis of poverty
can be found in Van Kerm (2004) for the case of Belgium and in Nilsson (2012) for a
study of poverty state dependence among twins in Sweden.
3 Data and definitions
3.1 Data
The data set used in the analysis is the Spanish component of the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) which is a harmonised cross-national longitudinal
survey collected across all members of the (former) European Union-15. The panel
runs from 1994 to 2001. Data is based on a standardised questionnaire that collects
information related to income, education, employment, household structure, housing,
health, social relations and individual satisfaction. The target population consists of
all private households throughout the national territory in every country and hence,
indigenous households are left out of the analysis.
3.2 Unit of analysis and sample size
Although the household is the unit of measurement for income, we examine poverty
dynamics at the individual level. As argued in OECD (2001), this methodological
choice offers the advantage of giving greater weight to larger families and makes
it possible to track the poverty status of individuals when family structure changes
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Table 1 Number of sample observations
Wave Individuals Total observations
1 (1994) 9.443 9.433
2 (1995) 8.914 18.347
3 (1996) 8.243 26.590
4 (1997) 7.691 34.281
5 (1998) 7.319 41.600
6 (1999) 6.926 48.526
7 (2000) 6.791 55.317
Total 55.317
Individuals between 25 and 64 years old (included)
Source: Own construction using the ECHP, 1994–2001. Note that the last poverty transitions take place
between 1999 and 2000 and therefore the total number of transitions observed is 48.526 when allowing
transitions to missing
(e.g. divorce, marriage, leaving parental home, etc.). Furthermore, and following pre-
vious literature, we restrict our analysis to the population between 25 and 64 years old.
As indicated by Arranz and Cantó (2007), it is among the Spanish working-age pop-
ulation that transitory or short-term poverty mainly takes place—and this is explicitly
what we model in this study. See also, OECD (2001) for similar evidence. Moreover,
we exclude individuals aged 65 or over in order to avoid the impact of retirement
decisions on poverty dynamics.
Table 1 shows the number of sample observations used for the empirical analysis.
Note that apart from the age of the individuals, no other restrictions are imposed on our
working sample.3 We allow individuals into the panel even if we know their poverty sta-
tus for one single year and they transit to missing in the following one. Thus, our panel
is unbalanced and maximizes the use of the information available in the survey. We con-
sider this feature of our analysis to be a major advantage because it does not incur pos-
sible sample selection problems and neither raises questions about representativeness.
3.3 Poverty
A person is considered poor if the equivalent income of the household where she/he
lives is below the poverty line defined as 60 % of the median of that distribution. The
threshold is relative to time so there is a poverty line for each of the years analysed. We
use the modified OECD equivalent scale as the scaling factor that takes into account
the economies of scale within the household by giving a weight of 1 to the first adult,
0.5 to the remaining adult members of the household and 0.3 to children under 14
3 For instance, Arranz and Cantó (2007) need to limit their analysis to individuals present in the survey
in 1994. Bárcena et al. (2006) restrict their analysis to adults participating during the eight waves of the
panel which considerably cuts their working sample. Cantó et al. (2003) with data from the ECPF limit
the sample to those individuals answering at least five quarterly questionnaires. It is sometimes argued that
results from bigger samples referred to shorter windows may be more representative and reliable than from
smaller samples for longer windows (see Jenkins 2011).
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years of age.4 Moreover, we assume that all incomes are pooled together and shared
equally among household members.
3.4 Income in the ECHP
The income distribution used in our analysis is net annual household income which
adds the income from all possible sources for all household members. As in other sur-
veys, annual income variables are collected retrospectively in the ECHP. For instance,
in wave 1, run in 1994, annual income variables refer to incomes obtained by house-
hold members in 1993. Neglecting this time lag between the period to which household
income refers (year t − 1) and the period to which household composition and other
variables of interest relate (year t) would introduce some bias. Therefore, net house-
hold income in year t − 1 is finally constructed as the sum of net personal income
reported at t of the individuals that were present in the household at t − 1 (see Debels
and Vandecasteele 2005; Arranz and Cantó 2007).5 This approach makes it possible
to build household equivalent income at each year with the household composition
(and equivalence scale) referring to the same year.
Note, however, that the choice of this income distribution implies, on the one hand,
that only seven waves of the panel can be used in our analysis, and, on the other, that a
certain number of missing values arise when one of the members of the household does
not report his/her income at t , either because of attrition or because this person refuses
to collaborate with this part of the questionnaire. Table 9 of the Appendix can be used to
check how differences in the population headcount ratio are very small either using or
not the income distribution with or without time lag in relation to the equivalence scale.
Table 10, on the other hand, shows how the use of the corrected household income
definition increases the number of transitions to missing by about 2.9 %. Nonethe-
less, we use an estimation technique that explicitly accounts for sample attrition (see
below).
4 Poverty dynamics in Spain: a description
The aim of this section is to briefly describe poverty transitions in Spain during the
analysed period for the proposed sample. Table 2 shows the poverty status of Spanish
individuals aged 25–64 at time t conditional on their status at t − 1. The first panel
shows the results when missing income information is not taken into account and the
second displays them when we do.
First of all, it is worth noting the important difference in the probability of being
poor at time t depending on the poverty status at t − 1. The chances of an individual
being poor at t were 58.41 % if s/he was already poor at t − 1 but only 8.17 % if
4 These methodological options follow the recommendations of the European Commission for the analysis
of poverty and social exclusion in the European Union (Laeken indicators).
5 Debels and Vandecasteele (2008) propose a more accurate measure that accounts for changes in household
composition within waves.
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Table 2 Poverty status at t
conditional of poverty status at
t − 1 in Spain without and with
income missing data, 1994–2000
Source: Own construction using
the ECHP, 1994–2001.
Individuals aged 25–64.
N=41.457 observations when
not taking into account the
missing information and
N=48.526 observations when
allowing transitions to missing
Year t
Not poor Poor Missing
t-1
Not poor 91.83 8.17 –
Poor 41.59 58.41 –
Total 83.26 16.74 –
t-1
Not poor 78.52 6.98 14.49
Poor 35.68 50.11 14.22
Total 71.23 14.32 14.45
not.6 One of the objectives of this study is to address the possibility of an endogenous
selection mechanism occurring by which individuals observed poor at t perhaps are
over (or under) represented at t − 1.
Secondly, it is interesting to observe the pattern of transitions to missing. Results
show that 14.49 % of individuals that are not poor at t − 1 are no longer observed at t .
Among those observed as poor, the percentage is 14.22. At first sight, it seems that sam-
ple retention is exogenous to poverty status at t −1. In the following section, however,
we explicitly address the question of potential non-random selection of the sample.7
Table 3 sheds additional light on the different transition probabilities year by year.
As can be observed, entry rates fluctuate between 6.17 and 8.18 % while exit rates do
so between 31.09 and 41.15 %. However, as similarly pointed out by Arranz and Cantó
(2007), there is no clear trend of poverty outflows and inflows throughout the period
and it is difficult to distinguish, on a descriptive level, a different sample retention
process for those who are poor and not poor at t − 1.8
Finally, Table 4 presents household income level as a percentage of the median
of those individuals entering or escaping poverty, which enables assessment of the
income level that is the starting point for a transition. As shown, the chances of falling
into poverty are highest for those with incomes between 60 and 70 % of the median
while they are much smaller as income increases. Interestingly though, such a clear
pattern does not emerge in the case of poverty exits: the opportunities for escaping
poverty are greater for those individuals with an income below 20 % of the median than
for those between 20 and 40 %.9 We give another explanation for this finding below.
6 These results are fairly similar to those obtained by Bárcena et al. (2006) with the same dataset as they
estimate an entry rate of 8.07 % and an exit rate of 39.80 %. Note, however, that they base their estimates on
a balanced panel for individuals that are in the panel for eight consecutive waves and are aged 16 or above.
7 In OECD (2001) it is argued that “Attrition bias may be particularly acute for the ECHP since attrition
rates are quite high for some of the participating countries (…) and the poverty population appears to drop
out of the sample at a disproportionate rate in most of these countries” (OECD 2001, p. 43). However, from
this descriptive analysis we do not find such a clear pattern in the Spanish case.
8 Arranz and Cantó (2007) with data from the ECHP also argue that “[…], the probability of attrition does
not appear to be determined by the individual poverty situation” (Arranz and Cantó 2007, p. 13).
9 Bárcena et al. (2006) in their descriptive analysis find an even greater similarity between the exit rate for
Spanish households with income below 10 % of the median and those between 50 and 60 % of the same.
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Table 3 Poverty status at t
conditional of poverty status at
t − 1 in Spain with income
missing data year by year,
1994–2000
Source: Own construction using
the ECHP, 1994–2001.
Individuals aged 25–64.
N =48.526 observations
Year Not poor Poor Missing
1995
1994 Not poor 79.43 7.41 13.17
Poor 41.15 43.88 14.97
1996
1995 Not poor 75.95 8.18 15.87
Poor 31.09 54.10 14.81
1997
1996 Not poor 79.34 6.17 14.50
Poor 34.52 50.00 15.48
1998
1997 Not poor 78.76 6.69 14.55
Poor 36.36 50.64 13.01
1999
1998 Not poor 76.99 6.54 16.47
Poor 35.37 47.74 16.89
2000
1999 Not poor 81.00 6.62 12.38
Poor 34.83 56.25 8.91
Table 4 Income level as percentage of the median of individuals entering and exiting poverty
Household income as % of the median Entry into poverty Exit from poverty
% of individuals Entry rate % of individuals Exit rate
[ 0,≤ 10] 5.22 38.88
[ 10,≤ 20] 5.29 36.33
[ 20,≤ 30] 8.30 31.31
[ 30,≤ 40] 14.23 35.52
[ 40,≤ 50] 25.93 42.24
[ 50,≤ 60] 41.04 48.54
[ 60,≤ 70] 32.98 33.53
[ 70,≤ 80] 20.82 18.78
[ 80,≤ 90] 13.80 13.36
[ 90,≤ 100] 9.26 8.71
[≥ 100] 23.13 2.87
100.00 8.17 100.00 41.59
Source: Own construction using the ECHP, 1994–2001. Individuals aged 25–64
Footnote 9 continued
The authors argue that temporary income variations, transitory absence of income and measurement error
may explain why exits do not seem to depend on the poverty gap. Cantó et al. (2003), however, explain that
the origin may be in demographic and labour market transitions.
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5 The model
In this work we study poverty transitions by following the proposed model by Cap-
pellari and Jenkins (2004a) which allows the estimation of state dependence and the
characterization of poverty persistence and poverty entries while at the same time
accounts for attrition and initial conditions.10 The model belongs to the Markovian
transition models approach.11
We build on a system of simultaneous equations that includes a first-order poverty
transitions equation for all the pooled annual transitions, the poverty status at t − 1
(in order to account for the initial conditions problem) and an equation for sample
retention (to consider potential non-random attrition) plus the correlations between
the three equations that are allowed to be freely estimated.12 We refer the interested
reader to the original article for a full econometric illustration of the model.
Let’s first define the poverty transitions equation. We assume that in period t indi-
viduals can be characterized by a latent poverty propensity p∗i t that takes the form:
p∗i t = [(Pit−1)α′1 + (1 − Pit−1)α′2]zit−1 + ωi t (1)
Pit = I (p∗i t  0) (2)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N refers to individuals, α′1 and α′2 are column vectors of
parameters, zit−1 is the vector of explanatory variables and ωi t the error term.
Note that this specification implies that two sets of coefficients are estimated: if
Pit−1 = 1, α′1zit−1 is relevant and refers to poverty persistence characteristics;
instead if Pit−1 = 0, α′2zit−1 is estimated and accounts for poverty entry charac-
teristics. Also the vector of explanatory variables always refers to t − 1 in order to
reduce endogeneity/simultaneity problems with poverty transitions (see Jenkins 2000;
Cantó 2003).13 Furthermore, ωi t can be written as ωi t = ζi + τi t where the first term
is the individual specific effect that stands for all unobserved determinants of condi-
tional poverty that are time-invariant for a given individual (e.g. ability, motivation,
etc.).14 The second term is the usual white noise error. Both parts of the error term are
10 See Cappellari and Jenkins (2002) for a less technical version of the paper.
11 Other types of models have become popular in the analysis of poverty transience in the last decades even
when most of them developed first in a different context: covariance structure models (Lillard and Willis
1978; Duncan and Rodgers 1991; Biewen 2005), hazard regression models (Stevens 1999; Devicienti 2001;
Fourage and Layte 2003), random effects panel models (Arulampalam et al. 2000; Biewen 2009; Poggi
2007) and dynamic microsimulation models (Burgess and Propper 1998; Aassve et al. 2006), to name some
of the most influential. See Jenkins (2000) for a review of the different strategies used to model poverty
transitions.
12 Note that the inclusion of a retention equation allows us the use of an unbalanced panel and therefore to
draw on all the information available in the panel.
13 We do not include as explanatory variables events taking place between t − 1 and t in order to avoid
contemporaneously correlated regressors.
14 We suppose that the unobserved heterogeneity of conditional poverty is common in the case of poverty
entry and poverty persistence. Van Kerm (2004), on the contrary, builds on a system of equations where the
poverty entry rate is estimated separately from the persistence and the individual-specific effects are dif-
ferent in each case. Conceptually we find it easier to think of a shared individual unobserved heterogeneity
for exits and (re)entries given it is a time-invariant concept.
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supposed to be normally distributed. I (p∗i t  0) is a binary indicator function equal to
one if the latent conditional poverty propensity is positive and equal to zero otherwise.
Our second equation accounts for (possibly) non-random attrition of the sample.15
Thus, we are considering the possibility that retention is not exogenous to unobserved
characteristics. The equation models the probability to observe the poverty status of
an individual both at t − 1 and at t and it can be defined as follows,
r∗i t = ϕ′wi t−1 + μi t (3)
Rit = I (r∗i t  0) (4)
where r∗i t is the latent probability of consecutive participation (retention) with known
poverty status, wi t−1 is the vector of explanatory variables, ϕ is the vector of param-
eters and μi t is the error term. Again, μi t can be written as μi t = ψi + λi t , being
the first term, the individual-specific effect and the second, the white noise error. Both
parts of the error term are assumed to follow a normal distribution. I (r∗i t  0) is a
binary indicator function.
A third equation allows to account for the initial conditions problem which arises
because the start of the observation window may not be the same than the start of
the poverty experience. It is worth noting that, in this work, initial conditions refer
to the base year poverty status of each poverty transition and not to the first period
observed as in Wooldridge’s tradition (see Wooldridge 2005; Devicienti 2001). The
equation enables to account for unobserved characteristics possibly endogenous to
poverty status at base year. Thus, we assume that in period t − 1, individuals can be
characterized by a latent poverty propensity which is defined as,
p∗i t−1 = β ′xit−1 + uit−1 (5)
Pit−1 = I (p∗i t−1  0) (6)
where xit−1 is the vector of explanatory variables that both describe the individual and
his/her household, β the vector of parameters and uit−1 the error term. Further, uit−1
can be written as uit−1 = ηi + δi t−1, where the first term is the individual-specific
effect and the second term is the white noise error. Both ηi and δi t−1 are assumed to
be normally distributed. And, I (p∗i t−1  0) is a binary indicator function equal to one
if the latent base year poverty propensity is positive and equal to zero otherwise.
Moreover, the model allows the three random effects to be freely correlated. If it
turns that they are, both selection processes are endogenous to poverty transitions
and the estimation of a univariate probit would lead to inconsistent estimators of the
parameters of interest (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2006). If all the correlations are
zero, we could actually estimate the equations separately. Thus, given the mentioned
assumptions, we define,
15 Cappellari and Jenkins (2004b) discriminate between attrition due to drop-out of the sample and eco-
nomic item non-response when modelling low pay transitions among British men aged 18–64 showing a
negligible impact on the estimates.
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ρ1 = cov(ψi , ηi ) = corr(μi t , uit−1) (7)
ρ2 = cov(ζi , ψi ) = corr(ωi t , μi t ) (8)
ρ3 = cov(ζi , ηi ) = corr(ωi t , uit−1) (9)
where ρ1 summarises the association between the unobservable individual-specific
factors related to the consecutive participation of a certain individual in the sample
and those determining the base year poverty status. If ρ1 is positive (negative) it means
that the individuals that are more likely to be consecutively participating in the sample
and their household informs of their income are also more (less) likely to be initially
poor. Similarly, ρ2 summarises the association between unobservable individual spe-
cific factors determining the poverty transitions and those related with retention of
a given individual. If ρ2 is positive (negative) it means that those individuals more
likely to be consecutively poor—or fall into poverty—are also more (less) likely to
be income retained in the sample. Finally, ρ3 summarises the association between
unobservable factors determining poverty transitions and those determining base year
poverty status. If ρ3 is positive (negative) those individuals more likely to be trans-
iting into poverty are also more (less) likely to be observed initially poor. Note that
the interpretation of these correlations refers only to unobserved heterogeneity factors
and not to observed characteristics we control for in the model.
Once the model is estimated, we can derive the transition probabilities. The persis-
tence probability is given by,
sit (zit−1, xit−1) ≡ Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 1)
= 2(α
′
1zit−1, β ′xit−1, ρ3)
(β ′xit−1)
(10)
And, the entry probability by,
eit (zit−1, xit−1) ≡ Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 0)
= 2(α
′
1zit−1,−β ′xit−1,−ρ3)
(−β ′xit−1) (11)
where (·) and 2(·) are the cumulative density functions of the univariate and bivar-
iate standard normal distributions, respectively. Note that this estimation technique
allows to predict what would have been the conditional poverty probability of indi-
viduals that actually attrit.
The model is estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using a Gew-
eke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) simulator.16 Differently from the original article,
we have used Halton draws instead of pseudo-random ones.17 Antithetics is also
16 The model has been estimated using the ml commands available in Stata® and following the instruc-
tions in Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) The maximization technique used is
the modified Newton–Raphson algorithm, default in Stata®. See also Gould and Sribney (1999) for more
information on ml use.
17 In simulation, draws from a density are used to calculate the average of a statistic over that density. As
proven by Train (2003), MSL is consistent, asymptotically normal, efficient and asymptotically equivalent
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applied.18 As argued by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006), Halton draws are more effec-
tive than pseudo-random ones because they provide the same accuracy with a smaller
number of draws which saves computational time.19 We do take into account for
intra-household correlation in poverty status by using robust standard estimates and
by clustering with the household identification number of the first year they participate
in the survey.
As indicated by Wooldridge (2002), in order to identify the model we need to use
exclusion restrictions. In the case of retention, we require a variable that explains why
an individual is more or less likely to attrit but that, at the same time, has no influence
on the probability of persistence or entry into poverty. In our case, we have used a
dummy variable that identifies original sample members—as suggested by Cappellari
and Jenkins (2004a)—together with a set of dummies describing the mode of inter-
viewing. It has been shown that individuals that participate in the first wave of survey
panels are more likely to continue participating. It is also reasonable to believe that
those individuals answering a self-administered questionnaire, a telephone or a proxy
interview as opposed to a face-to-face personal interview might be less interested in
the survey project or have less time for it and therefore may be less likely to be retained
in the future (see, Nicoletti and Peracchi 2005, and references therein). Coefficients
in Table 6 show this is actually the case.
The instruments for the initial conditions are more difficult to find, especially
because the ECHP does not collect family background information (as used in Cap-
pellari and Jenkins 2004a or Fusco and Islam 2011). Neither it is an easy exercise in
conceptual terms: there is a need to find a variable that influences the chances of being
poor at a given point in time but that does not affect the probability of poverty status
changing. Our final estimation includes a dummy in the initial conditions equation
that identifies whether the head of household suffers or not from a chronic disease.
Footnote 7 continued
to Maximum Likelihood (ML) as long as the number of draws used in the simulation (R) rises faster than
the square root of the sample size (√N ). In other words, the bias between MSL and ML diminishes as
more draws are used in the simulation. See also Chapter 5 in Greene (2000). Furthermore, we make use
of the programme mdraws made available by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) for Stata® users to generate
the draws. The primes used for the creation of the draws are 2, 3 and 5 and we present results for 100
draws—though similar results were obtained when we used 50, 75 and 125 draws. Haan and Uhlendorff
(2006) argue that the number of draws should not be an integer multiple of any of the primes used, however
we run the model with a prime number of draws and obtained almost identical results. Moreover, and
as explained in Train (2003), given that the simulated log-likelihood function is a sum over observations
of the log of simulated probabilities, if the draws are taken in such a way that negative correlation over
observations is created, then the variance of the sum is lower. And this is precisely what Halton sequences
do: they induce a negative correlation over observations. Halton draws are created to fill the unit interval
evenly with elements placed equidistantly apart. Each cycle covers the areas not covered by previous cycles.
Because Halton sequences in our study are created over 3 dimensions, we use the option burn to eliminate
the initial part of the sequences as it is customary (see Train 2003, p. 230).
18 Antithetic draws are obtained by creating various types of mirror images of every draw (see Train 2003,
p. 219). That way, the 100 Halton draws created per each of the 3 dimensions are finally 200 per equation.
Train (2003) argues that the antithetics substantially improve the estimation of probit models.
19 Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) show that calculations based on 1,000 pseudo-random draws get very
close to those derived using directly the bivariate normal probability distribution function as opposed to 50
pseudo-random draws. However, they also show that 100 Halton draws get even closer.
123
214 SERIEs (2013) 4:201–233
This variable serves as a proxy for background information related to health as we
assume that individuals only state that they have a chronic disease if it is a condition
that they have had for a long period of time, probably prior to the start of the survey.20
The validity of the instrument is confirmed in the following section.
There are several advantages to the methodology adopted in our study. First, and
as noted in Biewen (2009), it circumvents the strict exogeneity assumption by which
there must not be any feedback from poverty in a given period to future values of the
explanatory variables. In the model just presented, by definition, changes in employ-
ment status or family structure are not allowed to affect poverty until the following
period. Second, the model adapts well to different panel data structures given that it
only requires pooled transitions from the same individual.21 Third, the methodology
enables the estimation of state dependence through the different explanatory variables
and not only as one estimated parameter of the lagged dependent variable (which is
interpreted as genuine state dependence) as in the random-effects probit models pro-
posed by Wooldridge (2005) or Stewart (2007). Fourth, we can obtain comparable
estimates for poverty entry and persistence. Fifth, attrition is explicitly modelled and
not only allowed to depend on the initial conditions as in Wooldridge’s tradition. And,
finally, Cappellari and Jenkins’s model does not encounter problems with left-censor-
ing so individuals that are always poor or never poor are included in the estimates.
On the contrary, we are aware that the most important drawback of the model may be
the impossibility of controlling for duration dependence in poverty status. The dynam-
ics that the model can estimate are always between t − 1 and t , which is therefore not
as sophisticated as in hazard regression or variance component models. Moreover, as
Jenkins (2011) explains: “Markovian models assume that the accumulated impact of a
person’s history of poverty (and non-poverty) is expressed entirely by last year’s pov-
erty status” (Jenkins 2011, p. 332). As already mentioned, Arranz and Cantó (2011),
to cite the most recent study of the Spanish case, have shown the importance of dura-
tion in poverty dynamics analyses (see also Devicienti and Gualtieri 2007). However,
Devicienti (2001) also finds that controlling for unobserved characteristics reduces
the importance of duration dependence. The model we apply in this study does not
substitute the key findings obtained from duration dependence models. Rather, we
believe it can complement some of their results. Moreover, Cappellari and Jenkins’s
model requires valid instruments that may be difficult to find in different contexts
and/or data sets. Lastly, it is computationally more demanding than the estimation of
a random-effect probit model.22
20 Heckman (1981) suggested that initial conditions for labour market outcomes could be instrumented
with information prior to labour market entry. In our case, however, such a time line cannot be considered
because one can enter poverty at any moment in life.
21 Note that this is going to be particularly important for future research with the EU-SILC (Community
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) because most countries follow an integrated design by which
households participate in the panel at the most for four consecutive waves and each year 25 % of the sample
is substituted with new respondents. Moreover, initial conditions are going to be different for each rotational
group.
22 For example, a random-effect probit model can easily be estimated using the command xtprobit in
Stata®.
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6 Empirical results
We present the empirical findings by focusing first on the model specification results
in order to assess how well the model fits the data.23 Second, we introduce the findings
relative to state dependence, to move on to a discussion of the model coefficients and
marginal effects. Finally, some robustness checks are commented.
6.1 Model specification
Table 5 first presents the probability predictions of the model computed as shown
in Eqs. (10) and (11). Poverty persistence is 0.611 which compares closely to the
(unweighted) raw probability of 0.596 (or 0.605 if we compare to those retained).24
Similarly, the predicted proportion of individuals that enter poverty status at t (given
that they were not poor at t −1) is 0.089, which is close to the 0.081 from the raw data.
As for the probability of exit, a predicted 0.388 compares to 0.404. And finally, for the
proportion of individuals being retained, the value of the predicted probability and the
raw value are both 0.855. The same occurs for the proportion of initially poor (0.171).
Second, we test for possible ignorability of initial conditions and attrition. Table 5
also presents the results relative to the correlations when the poverty threshold is set at
60 % of the median of the household equivalent income distribution. As shown, none
of the estimated correlations is significantly different from zero. Thus, unobserved
heterogeneity affecting retention is not related to that which affects initial poverty
status or poverty transience which implies that the retention and the initial conditions
equations could actually have been estimated separately from that of transience.25,26
The exogeneity tests of the two selection processes considered could not be rejected by
the Wald tests conducted. These results necessarily support previous poverty dynamics
estimates for the Spanish case derived from the ECHP that did not consider unobserved
heterogeneity related to attrition and initial conditions when using the standard poverty
line. On the other hand, it strengthens the use of simpler computational strategies such
as that proposed by Wooldridge (2005) for the estimation of genuine state dependence.
As commented, in order to identify the model, it is crucial to find valid instruments.
Wald tests indicate that the fact that the head of household suffers from a chronic
disease could be excluded from the transitions equation, and the same occurs for
the original sample member dummy and the type of questionnaire answered. On the
contrary, both sets of instruments increase the precision of the initial conditions and
retention equations, respectively.
23 Model assumptions such as, for instance, normality of random effects, presented in the previous section
are presumed from this point onwards.
24 Note that the comparison is always with an unweighted probability as we do not have weights for those
individuals that attrit. Thus, the unweighted probabilities differ slightly from those presented in Table 2.
25 Differences in the predicted probabilities of persistence and entry among all individuals and the retained
sample are negligible which confirms the ignorability of retention.
26 Buddelmeyer and Verick (2008) did not find significant correlations in the Australian case either, but
argue that joint estimation improves efficiency.
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Table 5 Predicted probabilities, estimates of model correlations, exogeneity of initial conditions and sample
retention tests, validity of instruments, state dependence estimates and poverty duration predictions (p-values
in brackets)
Predicted probabilities
Poverty persistence 0.611
Poverty exit 0.388
Poverty entry 0.089
Initially poor 0.171
Sample retained 0.855
Correlations between unobservables
ρ1 0.0165 (0.353)
ρ2 −0.2849 (0.285)
ρ3 −0.1360 (0.191)
Tests for correlations
ρ1 = ρ2 1.85 (0.3963)
ρ1 = ρ3 2.58 (0.2749)
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 3.47 (0.3250)
Tests for instruments
Exclusion of ‘hh. suffers a chronic disease’ 4.57 (0.1017)
from transitions equation (2 d.f.)
Exclusion of OSM and interview 5.06 (0.7515)
type from transitions equation (8 d.f.)
Exclusion of all the instrument variables 9.44 (0.4906)
from transitions equation (10 d.f.)
Inclusion of ‘hh. suffers a chronic 18.42 (0.0000)
disease’ in IC equation (1 d.f.)
Inclusion of OSM and interview type 56.77 (0.0000)
in retention equation (4 d.f.)
State dependence
α′1 = α′2 (64 d.f.) 2445.24 (0.0000)
Aggregate state dependence (ASD) 0.523
Genuine state dependence (GSD) 0.271
Poverty duration prediction
Poverty spell duration (in years) 1.91 (mean); 0.93 (median)
Non-poverty spell duration (in years) 28.17 (mean); 19.16 (median)
Steady-poor probability 20.2 %
Source: Own construction using the ECHP, 1994-2001. Individuals aged 25 to 64
6.2 State dependence
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) define aggregate state dependence (ASD) as the simple
difference between the probability of being poor at t for those being poor at t − 1 and
the probability of being poor at t for those who were not poor at t − 1. Thus,
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ASD =
(∑
i∈(Pit−1=1)(Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 1))∑
i Pit−1
)
−
(∑
i∈(Pit−1=1)(Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 0))∑
i (1 − Pit−1)
)
(12)
The estimated value of the aggregate state dependence is 0.523—very close to that
obtained by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) for Britain (0.526) and by Buddlemeyer
and Verick (2007) for Australia (0.520). However, and as already argued, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between state dependence that is the result of heterogeneity and that
of genuine (or true) state dependence (GSD). The former occurs because certain indi-
vidual characteristics increase the probability of being poor and those characteristics
may exhibit persistence over time. The latter occurs when the experience of poverty
at the base year increases in itself the chances of being poor the following year.
In the framework of the model presented here, a simple Wald test of absence of
genuine state dependence can be formulated as H0 : α′1 = α′2. If the null hypothesis
is not rejected, it means that poverty status at t does not depend on poverty status at
t −1 since the overall effect of poverty entry is the same as that of poverty persistence
and no sign of GSD exists. Our estimates prove that this is not the case. The null
hypothesis of no genuine state dependence is rejected with a p-value of 0.000.
Moreover, we compute GSD by averaging throughout the sample the predicted
probability of being poor at t given poor at t − 1 minus the probability of being poor
at t given not poor at t −1. Note that GSD, as opposed to ASD, controls for individual
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Formally, it can be computed as follows:
GSD =
(
1
N
) N∑
i=1
[Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 1) − Pr(Pit = 1|Pit−1 = 0)] (13)
Based on our model estimates, GSD in the Spanish case amounts to 0.271—which
is between that obtained in the British case (0.310) by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a)
and in the Australian one (0.260) by Buddelmeyer and Verick (2008).27 Thus, in Spain,
poverty in a given period increases the probability of being poor in the following period
relative to another individual with identical characteristics that was not initially poor.
About half the aggregate state dependence is genuine.28 Our findings highlight the
27 Fusco and Islam (2011) obtain a value of 0.38 and 0.70 for GSD and ASD, respectively for the case of
Luxembourg. And, Faye et al. (2011) estimate GSD to be 90 % of ASD in Nairobi’s slums. However, note
that their data set consists of only two waves.
28 In order to be able to compare these results, and following Wooldridge (2005), we also estimate a
dynamic random-effects probit model for poverty at t that controls for state dependence, unobserved heter-
ogeneity and initial conditions, which assumes a certain correlation between time-varying covariates and the
specific-effect (see Stewart 2007) and with explanatory variables referred to t − 1. We obtain fairly similar
results with an ASD of 0.472, GSD of 0.227 and a percentage GSD/ASD of 48 %. (Results available from
the author on request.) Note, however, that the more generally used specification by which explanatory
variables refer to the same period as the dependent variable (as in Gradín and Cantó 2011) results in a
lower degree of genuine state dependence which questions whether the fulfilment of the strict exogeneity
assumption overstates GSD.
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balanced need for tax-benefit policies and those that centre on education, training and
the acquisition of skills—both types of policy are called for given that individual het-
erogeneity and genuine state dependence are similarly relevant for explaining poverty
in Spain.
Our findings in Table 6 are completed by computing the mean duration of a poverty
spell (1/1 − sit ), the median duration of a poverty spell (log(0.5)/ log(si )), the mean
duration of a non-poverty spell (1/ei ), the median duration of a non-poverty spell
(log(0.5)/ log(1−ei )) and the unconditional probability of being poor (1/ei +1− si )
(see Boskin and Nold 1975, for a full derivation of this formulae and an application
to welfare subsidies recidivism). As shown, a poverty spell in Spain lasts an average
of nearly two years, while non-poverty spells around 14 times longer.
6.3 Observed heterogeneity
Table 6 shows the coefficients and marginal effects for the probability of poverty entry
and persistence and Table 7 presents those of retention and base year poverty. It is
worth noting that more covariates are significant in the case of entries as opposed
to persistence which is consistent with the fact that recurrent poverty affects more
heterogeneous individuals which, in turn, highlights how policies should not only be
targeted at poor individuals but also at those at risk of falling into it (Jenkins 2011).
Most characteristics of heads of households are statistically significant in explaining
poverty entry. Having no formal qualifications, or being self-employed, unemployed
or of immigrant origin are positively related to it. Thus, labour market income insta-
bility is associated with entries while being an immigrant is clearly the most important
risk factor—it increases the chance by 14 %. However, age is negatively related to pov-
erty entry but this effect reverses when getting older (which probably reflects upward
mobility in the labour market) and also having completed at least secondary school.
For instance, living in a household whose head has a university degree reduces the
probability of entry by 18.8 % in comparison to someone who only completed primary
school. As for demographic characteristics of the household, the presence of children
older than 2 increases the chances of entry while cohabiting with older adults or there
being other workers in the household reduces it.29
Low educational qualifications and having a head of household of immigrant ori-
gin are positively associated with poverty persistence. Interestingly, cohabiting with
people aged 19–24 reduces the probability of being permanently poor as opposed to
thereby having individuals aged 12–15. In Spain, during the analysed period nearly
40 % of individuals aged 19–24 that were living with their parents were working. The
help-effect provided by young people to their families has been documented before
by Cantó and Mercader (2001) and Ayllón (2009). Again, the number of workers in
29 Remember that our model includes individuals from 25 to 64 years of age. Therefore, it does not reflect
the economic conditions of elderly households, which are normally in greater economic hardship than the
overall population. However, the covariate reflects the effect of the presence of an elderly individual in a
younger household possibly income pooling his/her retirement pension.
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the household is negatively related to finding individuals constantly below the poverty
line.30
Nearly all coefficients in the base year poverty status equation are statistically sig-
nificant and have the expected sign. Finally, characteristics that we believe may give
stability to a household, such as having children or being employed, are positively
related with sample retention, while being an immigrant, living in rented housing or
cohabiting with someone older than 75 are negatively associated with it.
6.4 Robustness checks
Our robustness checks have focused on the sensitivity of the results to the choice of
poverty line, to the definition of poverty transitions and to individual heterogeneity
within the initially non-poor group.
The first rows in Table 8 show the estimates of the cross-equation correlations, pre-
dicted probabilities, ASD and GSD estimates depending on different poverty thresh-
olds. Interestingly, the results are sensitive to the poverty line with the same model
specification. When the poverty line is set at 40 or 50 % of the median, the correlation
between unobservables affecting poverty transitions and poverty status at the base year
(ρ3) is negative and statistically significant at a 95 % confidence level which indicates
that individuals more likely to be observed as poor in the base year are less likely to
remain poor in comparison with the non-poor group. In other words, the lower the level
of household equivalent income at t −1, the greater the chances of a change in poverty
status between t −1 and t . Ignoring this endogeneity would lead to an underestimation
of poverty persistence when poverty is more extremely defined—note the important
differences between predicted and raw probabilities. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a)
also obtain a negative value for this correlation with data from the BHPS and argue
that it can be interpreted as an example of Galtonian regression towards the mean.
As defined in Barnett et al. (2005), regression to the mean occurs when we observe
repeated measurements of the same subject, because relatively high or relatively low
observations are likely to be followed by less extreme ones—a phenomenon first dis-
cussed by Galton in 1886 in his study of hereditary stature (see Stigler 1999). As
argued by Stewart and Swaffield (1999), note that those with very low equivalent
household income at t − 1 have a greater chance of their poverty status changing
the lower the poverty threshold is. Regression towards the mean is stronger for val-
ues at the extreme.31,32 Additionally, this result helps to explain the findings in our
30 In a very similar fashion, Cantó et al. (2012) find that poverty recurrence is most importantly related
to there being children in the household and being self-employed while chronic poverty is associated with
low qualifications, less wage earners and a head of household having a fixed-term contract.
31 Nevertheless, we checked that a trimming of 1 or 2 % of both tales of income distribution is not suffi-
cient to eliminate regression towards the mean. A 5 % trimming results in ρ3 being not precisely estimated.
However, the correlation between unobservables affecting retention and initial conditions (ρ1) becomes
negative and strongly significant, which may indicate a trade-off between initial conditions and retention
endogeneity.
32 The fact that when setting the poverty line at 60 % of the median none of the correlations are precisely
estimated in the Australian and Spanish cases may indicate a better sample design of the HILDA dataset
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descriptive analysis, whereby exit rates were highest for individuals at the very bottom
of the income distribution than for those between 20 and 40 % of the median—see
Table 4. The results are possibly indicating a certain degree of measurement error at
the extremes of the income distribution.
Furthermore, when poverty is defined as below 40 or 50 % of the median, note how
ρ2 is also negative and statistically significant, meaning that unobservables that make
individuals more likely to be observed successively in the panel also make them less
likely to remain poor or fall into poverty compared to those that attrit. It is reasonable
to believe that those individuals living in the worst economic conditions may have
more unstable accommodation (so they are more difficult to trace) or may simply
be less interested in the survey (for example, due to demoralisation). If we do not
take this into account, persistence and entry into deep economic hardship would be
underestimated.
ASD estimates increase as the poverty line does likewise. However, note how the
percentage GSD/ASD is greatest when the poverty line is more extremely defined
(40 % of the median). This means that individual heterogeneity is less important for
explaining persistence—individuals above and below the threshold are less hetero-
geneous. However, at the bottom of the distribution, GSD exerts its greatest influ-
ence. These results indicate that poverty reduction among the poorest households
should be tackled more effectively by income-support policies (namely, transfers) as
individual heterogeneity is less important for explaining more severe poverty. As
for the remaining poverty lines, no clear pattern emerges in terms of percentage
GSD/ASD.
Another question that has frequently been considered in the literature is the pos-
sibility of transitions being the result of a very small change in income around the
poverty line. As stated by Bane and Ellwood (1986), “The poverty line is an arbitrarily
defined concept, and small ‘random’ changes in income can move people across the
line, creating a ‘spell’ even though no change of any significance to the individual
involved occurred” (Bane and Ellwood 1986, p. 7). In order to reduce the potential
bias caused by measurement error, in the second panel in Table 8, we define exits
from (and entries into) poverty as being when household equivalent post-transition
income is greater (or less) than 110 % (90 %) of the poverty line. As expected, both
ASD and GSD are among the highest of all estimated models and so the percentage
GSD/ASD indicates that a better filter for genuine poverty transitions is in place.
Nonetheless, cross-equation correlations are not significant as in our main estima-
tion.
Finally and as already indicated by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a), GSD results
may be driven by the major heterogeneity found among initially non-poor indi-
viduals. In order to check the robustness of our state dependence estimates, we
split the group of individuals above the poverty line into four categories accord-
ing to their household equivalent income relative to the median of distribution
(60–80 % of the median, 80–100 %, 100–150 % and more than 150 %) and com-
Footnote 32 Continued
and the Spanish component of the ECHP as opposed to the BHPS given that the more extreme a working
sample is relative to the population, the more room there is to regress towards the mean.
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pute four different measures of ASD and GSD depending on the income band to
which the individual belongs at t − 1 (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2004a, Sec-
tion 5, for full details). The third panel in Table 8 shows how poverty entry rates
decrease as base year income increases. The absence of GSD was rejected in all
income bands by statistical tests (not shown) with p-value ≺0.000 indicating that
previous results were not driven by ignoring heterogeneity among the non-poor
group.
7 Conclusions
The main aim of this paper has been to provide an analysis of the determinants
and mechanisms behind poverty dynamics in Spain by focusing on poverty entries
and persistence among the working-age population. Model estimates have shown
that current poverty is highly determined by past poverty experiences in Spain:
about 50 % of aggregate state dependence is genuine: the experience of poverty in
a given year increases in itself the chances of being poor in the following year.
Moreover, we have shown that poverty persistence is strongly related with living
with a head of household that has no education, being an immigrant or cohabiting
with teenagers. However, living with employed individuals, residing with young peo-
ple and, especially, having a university degree are negatively associated with pov-
erty persistence. Poverty entries are reversely associated with head of household’s
age, cohabitation with elderly people, having at least a secondary school certifi-
cate and the number of employed individuals in the household. Self-employment,
unemployment, illiteracy, parenting and migration are all associated with poverty
entry.
Our findings have important consequences for policy design as they call for a
comprehensive and coordinated strategy against poverty that should equally focus
on income-support policies—in order to break the vicious circle of consecutive pov-
erty—and on individual and household characteristics—promoting employability via
education and training, enhancing the conciliation of working and family life, sup-
porting families with children and teenagers or contributing to immigrant integration,
among many others.
The methodology used in the paper has enabled the assessment of whether sam-
ple retention and initial conditions are endogenous selection processes to poverty
transitions not only via observed heterogeneity but also through unobserved one.
Following the simultaneous model proposed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) and
using Maximum Simulated Likelihood, we have found that unobservables affect-
ing poverty status at base year and/or retention are not correlated with unobserva-
bles associated with poverty transitions when using the standard poverty line defined
as 60 % of the median of the household equivalent income. Therefore, and as for
unobserved heterogeneity, poverty transitions can be estimated separately from ini-
tial conditions and retention for the Spanish case when using the ECHP. In this
regard, our results reinforce those of other researchers that have studied poverty
dynamics without accounting for the possible correlations between unobservables
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related with transience, attrition and initial conditions (see the Review section of this
paper).
Moreover, from our robustness checks, we have found that unobservables affecting
poverty status at the base year and poverty transience are significant and negatively
correlated when the poverty line moves to 40 or 50 % of the median. Thus, unobserv-
ables that make individuals more likely to be found at the lowest extreme of income
distribution in a given year also make them less likely to remain in that position in
the following period. As argued, this result can be seen as a Galtonian regression
towards the mean by which relatively high or low observations of a subject are likely
to be followed by less extreme ones. Similarly, individuals that are more likely to be
observed successively in the panel are less likely to remain poor or fall into poverty
compared to those that attrit. Ignoring the endogeneity of both processes would under-
estimate our poverty persistence and entry predictions for those in the worst economic
hardship.
There are different avenues for future research. So far, we have been able to mea-
sure the degree of poverty genuine state dependence but little is known about what lies
behind it. Disentangling the different possible sources related to this scarring effect
should be highly relevant in policy design. Also, one could consider the possibility of
accounting for more sophisticated dynamics than those presented here, thus, getting
closer to the structure of duration dependence models. Finally, future research could
also reassess our results by applying this methodology to the new EU-SILC data once
the panel has become more mature and considering it is meant to become the reference
source for comparative statistics on income, poverty and social exclusion in Europe.
As mentioned, this methodology adapts especially well to the rotational nature of the
panel.
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Appendix
See Tables 9 and 10.
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Table 9 Headcount ratio (whole population) and number of individual-wave observations by income
definition
Wave Income refers to Income definition [1] Income definition [2]
Poor Obs Poor Obs.
1 (1994) 1993 19.59 22.837 –
2 (1995) 1994 18.98 20.458 18.66 18.677
3 (1996) 1995 17.97 19.278 18.21 17.488
4 (1997) 1996 20.34 17.916 20.63 16.183
5 (1998) 1997 18.18 16.598 18.31 15.026
6 (1999) 1998 18.89 15.863 18.89 14.168
7 (2000) 1999 18.02 14.784 18.48 13.349
8 (2001) 2000 18.82 14.270 18.86 12.935
Source: Own construction using the ECHP, 1994–2001. [1] Household income refers to t − 1 but the
equivalence scale refers to t . [2] Household income and equivalence scale refer to t . Cross-sectional weights
used. Notice that the headcount ratio for 1993 cannot be computed as we do not know household composition
for this year. In few cases where there is missing income information for one household members, we were
able to impute to that individual the income information given in the survey for within household non-
response (0.37 % of the individuals-waves sample). Also, note that household income for year t − 1 cannot
be computed in those households where one of the household members dies at t . In these cases, we proxied
his/her personal income at t with the one reported at t − 1 (0.30 % of the individuals-wave sample)
Table 10 Poverty status at t conditional of poverty status at t −1 in Spain with missing income information
and by income definition (whole population)
Year t
Not poor Poor Missing
[1] t − 1
Not poor 80.80 7.73 11.46
Poor 34.50 53.79 11.71
Total 72.05 16.44 11.51
[2] t − 1
Not poor 78.22 7.36 14.42
Poor 32.83 53.06 14.12
Total 69.65 15.98 14.37
Source: Own construction using the ECHP, 1994–2001. [1] Household income refers to t − 1 but the
equivalence scale refers to t (1993–2000). [2] Household income and equivalence scale refer to t (1994–
2000). Cross-sectional weights used
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